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INTRODUCTION
During 2001, two anti-dumping cases were brought forward on
tomatoes in the North American fresh tomato trade.  On March 28, 2001,
U.S. greenhouse tomato growers filed an anti-dumping petition with the
United States International Trade Commission (USITC) and the United State
Department of Commerce (DOC).  Three months later, Canadian green-
house growers announced they would file an anti-dumping complaint
against U.S. fresh tomato imports, and that complaint was formally filed
with the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) on September 28,
2001.  In both cases, preliminary findings of dumping and injury were
upheld, and formal inquiries are taking place at this time.  The U.S. case
has just had (February 19, 2002) its final determination of dumping, in-
cluding the margin of dumping, and is in the final phase of determination
of injury to U.S. producers.  The Canadian case is also in its final phases,
both in term of the margin of dumping and injury.
So we have here an unusual situation in which two similar com-
modities are facing anti-dumping proceedings between two countries where
the charges are being leveled by both countries against the industry in the285
other.  Even though one case is focused on a subset of fresh tomatoes,
namely greenhouse tomatoes, and the other is on fresh tomatoes more
generally, it may strike one as odd that there can be dumping going on in
both countries simultaneously, from Canada into the United States for green-
house tomatoes, and from the United States into Canada for fresh toma-
toes.  After all, dumping is supposed to be a kind of predatory behavior of
a firm that has market power across borders and is harming the other firms
in the importing country’s domestic industry in order to drive them out of
business.
This adds an element of curiosity to what otherwise seems to be
just another pair of cases in a long list of such anti-dumping cases that
seem to crop up regularly in the post-Uruguay Round period.  It is the
purpose of this paper to give an overview of what is happening in each of
these two cases, and to examine them more closely to see if there are any
lessons of broader interest.  One question that occurs is whether these anti-
dumping cases are in some way legitimate or, as some have argued, just a
different but now common expression of protectionist actions.  Another
question is whether anti-dumping actions make any sense within the agri-
cultural sector where significant market power at the commodity level is
not prevalent, and whether or not current regulations should be applied at
all to cases within the agricultural sector.  We will try and shed some light
on each of these questions.
LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR ANTI-DUMPING CASES
Drawing on the 1994 updating of Article VI of the GATT, “dump-
ing” is defined as a situation “by which products of one country are intro-
duced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value
of the products.”  This kind of action “is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury or materially retards the establishment of a do-
mestic industry” (GATT, 1994).  The article goes on to define what is im-
porting at less than normal value, that to offset or prevent dumping an anti-
dumping duty may be levied at a level of less than or equal to the “margin
of dumping” (defined as the difference between the exported and normal
value of the product as described above), and that in order to impose any
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anti-dumping duty it must be determined that “the effect of the dumping
… is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic
industry or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic
industry.”
Importing at less than its normal value arises under three alterna-
tive situations.  These are defined as being “if the price of the product
exported from one country to another:
• is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade,
for the like product when destined for consumption in the ex-
porting country, or,
• in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
- the highest comparable price of the like product for export to
any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
- the cost of production of the product in the country of origin
plus a reasonable addition for selling costs and profit.”  (GATT,
1994).
Of these three situations, one commonly observes within agriculture-re-
lated anti-dumping cases that it is the last of the three ( whether the import
price is less than the cost of production of that product)  that is used to
indicate whether dumping is occurring.
Little guidance on what exactly constitutes material injury is given
in Article VI, but in the Uruguay Round Agreement, there is a special “Agree-
ment on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994” which among
other things spells out in Article 3 in more detail the procedures by which
injury occurs.  This quite lengthy article emphasizes the importance of the
volume of imports, price undercutting, price depression, and the impor-
tance of separating the price effects of imports compared to other eco-
nomic factors that may be relevant in price determination.  In other words,
some emphasis is given to showing convincingly, not just alleging, a causal
relationship between increased imports and the resulting price declines
that injure domestic firms.287
These are the legal guidelines given to countries that investigate
anti-dumping  complaints that are lodged, each with its own operating
procedures.  Following these  guidelines, the investigations have two com-
ponents: proving first that dumping has occurred, and then that this dump-
ing has provoked injury.
THE U.S. CASE AGAINST GREENHOUSE TOMATOES FROM
CANADA
There were six main issues in the U.S. case:
• how to define the product and industry under consideration (what
is “like product”?);
• what is the export price;
• what is normal value;
• what is the exporter’s cost of production;
• what is the margin of dumping; and
• does the import of Canadian greenhouse tomatoes inflict injury
on the U.S. industry?
The product definition is important in order to know the “compari-
son” between industry and market, and most importantly to ascertain
whether or not there is injury to the U.S. domestic industry. The next three
issues, export price, normal value, and cost of production, are needed,
according to the legislation and regulations that are applicable, to deter-
mine if dumping is occurring and, if so, by how much (the margin of
dumping). Finally, all of this is only relevant if there is judged to be injury
to the U.S. domestic growers.  That means determining that dumping is
occurring, and that injury is involved, are the two necessary conditions
required in order for an anti-dumping duty to be charged.
Like Product
The main issue here was whether the investigation should be lim-
ited to greenhouse tomatoes or should include all fresh tomatoes including
field tomatoes.  In this case, the Department of Commerce ruled that the
investigation would focus on greenhouse tomatoes, and that they are a
distinct domestic product.  They arrived at this conclusion by examining
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evidence on the production processes involved, costs, pricing and market-
ing, plus physical characteristics like skin thickness, water content, colour,
texture and taste. Noticeably absent from this list, from an economist’s
perspective, is some indication about consumer demand and substitution
relationships between fresh field and greenhouse tomatoes, in particular
what kind of price elasticities of demand are likely in these two products.
Why are these considerations important?  The investigating au-
thorities needed to obtain pricing and cost information, not to mention
import volume data, so it was necessary to be sure about the commodity
that is being examined.  However, it is even more important in the injury
investigation to specify if attention should be given to all fresh tomatoes or
only the subset that is greenhouse tomatoes.  In that investigation, one is
really interested in the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand, in or-
der to see to what extent a specified increase in sales of imported green-
house tomatoes would lower the price of greenhouse tomatoes.  If the
definition is a broad one and fresh field tomatoes substituted reasonably
with greenhouse tomatoes, an increased volume of imported greenhouse
tomatoes would have little effect on the greenhouse industry price (given
the substantial dominance of field tomatoes in total consumption), hence
there would be little injury to domestic greenhouse growers arising from
the imports.  Conversely, the volume of imports could have enough of an
effect on the domestic greenhouse tomato price that increased imports would
injure domestic greenhouse tomato growers.
Export Price
The next major issue is the export price.  The objective is to ascer-
tain the price at which the offending imports were sold into the trade in the
United States.  These data were obtained initially by the petitioners of the
case from USDA terminal market prices, adjusted by transportation and
customs duties, inland freight within the United States, and standard com-
missions to arrive at the ex-factory prices.  Subsequently, data were ob-
tained directly from the exporting firms alleged to be dumping by the De-
partment of Commerce officials who were undertaking the dumping in-
vestigation.  The procedure is the same: observe the U.S. selling price,
then subtract the various charges and costs to arrive at the ex-factory price289
(fob price) in Canada.  Furthermore, because there were several product
categories of greenhouse tomatoes (e.g., common round tomatoes (beef-
steak), cherry tomatoes, plum or pear tomatoes and cluster or “on-the-
vine” tomatoes, these calculations were done for each of the categories.  In
this case, twenty HS numbers (tariff lines) were involved.
Normal Value
“Normal value” is the price in the exporter’s domestic market at
which the product in question is sold in the course of normal trade, assum-
ing sales into the Canadian domestic market are sufficient to allow calcula-
tion of a normal value, which was the case.  To determine this normal
value, standard published data from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
were the starting point, followed by the more detailed preliminary and
final determinations where actual selling prices are obtained from the ex-
porters involved in the case. However, the petitioners or complainants in
this case (the U.S. greenhouse industry firms filing the complaint) had
reason to believe that the within-Canada sales of greenhouse tomatoes
were made at prices that were below the cost of production of those toma-
toes. Therefore they requested that the Department of Commerce conduct
a “sales-below-cost” investigation.  This is a fairly standard procedure, the
reason for which is to see if a significant share of the sales in the domestic
market is being made at prices below the cost of production.  If so, then the
previously constructed “normal value” is of no use since it would lead to
comparing the export price in the U.S. against an artificially low domestic
price in Canada.
In this situation, any sales within Canada at prices below cost were
not included in the calculation of the Normal Value.  This is the situation
that the complainants believed was the case in their request for the sales-
below-cost investigation which requires a cost of production calculation to
be done.
Cost of Production Analysis
The Department of Commerce undertook such an analysis, coun-
try-wide, which follows legislative guidelines laid out for such calcula-
tions.  Costs of production include cost of  materials and fabrication, sell-
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ing, general, administrative, interest and packing expenses.  Capital costs
are included and an amount for profit is added.  These costs were obtained
from the exporting companies concerned, with numerous interactions be-
tween the companies and the DOC investigators in the preparation of the
final determination.  For each Canadian greenhouse tomato exporting firm
a cost for each type of tomato was arrived at by determining a weighted
average of all contributing farms.
Anti-Dumping Margin Calculations
The final step in determining dumping, and a dumping margin, is
to compare the constructed export prices with normal values, adjusted us-
ing the cost of production data by deleting any domestic sales made at
prices below cost, as noted above.  This was done for each greenhouse
exporter, using a weighted average across all tomato products being ex-
ported.  There was a Preliminary Determination of these margins on Octo-
ber 2, 2001, where the margins ranged from 0.00% to 50.75%.  The Final
Determination on February 19, 2002 confirmed that dumping was occur-
ring, but the rates ranged by exporter from less than 2% (de minimis mar-
gins, which are treated as if they were zero) to 18 percent, with an average
of 16 percent.  These final determination rates were imposed on all green-
house tomatoes with exporter-specific rates.  They were, however, subject
to the final determination of injury by the ITC to be completed by April,
2002.
Injury Determination
This part of the process is undertaken by the International Trade
Commission, which  completed its preliminary determination in May 2001.
Its final determination is yet to be completed, as noted above, so all our
information is drawn from the preliminary report. The first element of the
injury examination is the subject of like product.  The issues involved here
are raised in the section above on like product.  In the preliminary determi-
nation, the conclusion was that greenhouse tomatoes alone were the like
product,  but the conclusion was mixed, that there are some differences
and that this question must  be re-examined in the final phase of the inves-
tigation.  In particular it was acknowledged that the two tomato types are
substitutes in demand in a variety of situations.  Given the much larger291
field tomato market, if the two products are relatively close substitutes, the
greenhouse tomato price would be largely determined by the field tomato
price.  In that case the impact of import volumes of greenhouse tomatoes
would have much more modest effects on tomato prices, and comparably
modest levels of injury that could arise.
In determining injury, the Commission concluded that “there is
reasonable indication that the domestic greenhouse tomato industry is
materially injured by reason of subject imports from Canada.”  However,
the evidence given was sufficiently mixed that it acknowledged this would
have to be examined in more detail in the final determination. Some of the
evidence brought forward is the following.  The market for greenhouse
tomatoes have grown steadily since 1998, while the demand for field to-
matoes has remained stable at a higher level of consumption.  The produc-
tion of U.S. greenhouse tomatoes has also expanded over this period at the
same rate as consumption has expanded.  Therefore the market share of
U.S. production has remained constant.  The volume of Canadian (sub-
ject) imports has grown quickly, more rapidly than the market has grown.
Their market share has grown from 34 percent to 44 percent.  What makes
this all add up is that non-Canadian greenhouse tomato imports have de-
clined equivalently.  So Canadian export growth in this market has been at
the expense of Mexican and European exports.
Price Effects
As is appropriate, considerable attention was paid to the price for-
mation process in greenhouse tomatoes.  At the outset, it was noted that the
domestic industry is highly concentrated, but that with the product being
perishable and with no inventories, the ability of individual market partici-
pants to affect market-wide prices is constrained.  This position is con-
firmed by the fact that most of these tomatoes are sold on the spot market
or under one-week contracts.  Of particular relevance to this inquiry, is the
question of whether Canadian imports depressed the price in this market
or have they prevented prices from increasing.  Price patterns on indi-
vidual sales show a mixed pattern of underselling and overselling, but
increasingly they undersold domestic product in the last year, 2000, in 61
percent of the cases to retailers which is the dominant channel of sales.
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Looking at average unit values of prices to domestic producers,
they fell from 1998 to 1999 but then rose from 1999 to 2000.  The Com-
mission noted that the supply and price of field tomatoes appeared to in-
fluence prices of greenhouse tomatoes, and the seasonal pattern conformed
to field tomato seasonality which predates greenhouse tomato production.
Finally, it was observed that 2000 prices, although higher than 1999, were
lower than in 1998, and this was more so for those tomato product types
where the Canadian product was more common. The Commission found
that, for the purposes of its preliminary determination, there was  “suffi-
cient information to conclude that the subject imports had significant price
depressing and price suppressing effects on prices of the domestic like
product” (i.e., greenhouse tomatoes).  It also acknowledged that in the
final investigation, it would explore further the effects of Canadian imports
as well as field tomatoes and non-subject imports on prices of greenhouse
tomatoes.
In its summary of injury assessment, the Commission noted that
production was growing, net sales were increasing, and hours worked by
and wages paid to production and related workers were also increasing.
But by many financial indicators, the U.S. domestic greenhouse industry
was in some difficulty.  Profit margins were flat or declining over the three
years.  Therefore, the Commission concluded that due to the price de-
pressing effects of the Canadian imports and the industry’s poor financial
condition, there was a reasonable indication that the U.S. industry was
materially injured by reason of these imports.
THE CANADIAN CASE AGAINST FRESH TOMATOES FROM THE
UNITED STATES
On September 28, 2001, a group of greenhouse tomato growers in
Canada (Canadian Tomato Trade Alliance, or CTTA) filed a complaint al-
leging dumping by U.S. fresh tomato growers.  On November 9, 2001, the
Canadian Customs Revenue Agency (CCRA) initiated a dumping investi-
gation into this case and filed a Statement of Reasons to outline the initial
analysis.  At the completion of that investigation it was to issue a prelimi-
nary determination of dumping that is expected at the end of March 2002.293
At the same time the Canadian International Trade Tribunal was conduct-
ing a preliminary inquiry to determine if there were a reasonable indica-
tion that the dumping had caused or threatened to cause injury to the Ca-
nadian industry.  If these investigations found dumping and injury, a pro-
visional duty could be applied equal to the estimated margin of dumping.
Final determinations regarding dumping and injury, or termination of the
investigation if dumping were not found, follow within three to four months
of the preliminary findings.
Like Goods
  Under Canadian anti-dumping legislation, like goods have “the
same physical characteristics (same genus and species), are substitutes,
follow the same distribution network and fulfill the same customer needs.
On this basis, fresh tomatoes produced by the Canadian industry, largely
greenhouse tomatoes, were found to be “like the subject goods (U.S. fresh
tomatoes, almost always field tomatoes).  However, fresh tomatoes for the
fresh market were distinguished as being different from fresh tomatoes
used for processing.  It should be noted that in the Canadian case, the
determination of like goods or like product is different than in the U.S.
case against Canadian greenhouse tomatoes, despite using similar criteria
as to what constitutes like goods.
Export Price
The export price in Canada is considered to be “generally the lesser
of the importer’s purchase price or the exporter’s selling price to Canada,
less all costs, charges and expenses resulting from the exportation of the
goods.”  The CTTA estimated these prices in its complaint, drawing on
terminal market prices published by Agriculture Canada. These were com-
pared to actual declared selling prices on customs documentation by the
CCRA and it was found that the CTTA prices if anything were higher.  This
would make dumping less likely (i.e., a more conservative estimate), so
the CTTA prices were accepted by the CCRA as reasonable.
Normal Value: Domestic Price
Much as in the U.S. anti-dumping legislation and procedures de-
scribed above, Canadian anti-dumping procedures base “normal values”
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on the domestic selling price of goods in the country of export, or on the
total unit cost of the goods plus an amount for profit.  In this case, the
CTTA chose not to use U.S. domestic selling prices for estimating normal
value because the CTTA alleged that there are substantial quantities of
tomatoes sold domestically at prices below production costs in the U.S.
This is not unusual in sales of agricultural products in both Canada and the
U.S., and the CTTA were able to find newspaper articles to support their
claim that U.S. field tomatoes were being sold below cost for the majority
of the year.
Normal Value: Cost of Production
When normal values are derived from costs of production, those
costs are defined to include the costs of producing the goods, plus a rea-
sonable amount for administrative, selling, all other costs (presumably in-
cluding capital costs), and profit.  Because there are two main field tomato
producing areas of the United States, (California and Florida account for
more than seventy percent of U.S. field tomatoes), the CTTA produced
two sets of production costs, one for each region.  For California, a Uni-
versity of California study of tomato costs was used as the base for cash
costs, and a consultant developed a cost model that added non-cash over-
head costs that included capital costs.  In addition, local distribution and
freight were added, as were an administrative, marketing and selling cost
component.  For Florida, a University of Florida (Food and Resource Eco-
nomics Department) study was used as the base, adjusted to include local
distribution, freight, administrative, marketing, and selling costs.  No com-
ponent for profit was added.  These estimates, done for 1998 and 1999
respectively, were brought up to the year 2000 by indexing them by the
U.S. Farm Input Price Index.  The CCRA verified the cost estimates with
the I.T.C. and the California Tomato Commission and found the CTTA
estimates to be “in line” with other data.  Given the conservative nature of
these cost estimates (ignoring profit), the CCRA accepted the CTTA’s esti-
mated normal values.
Margin of Dumping
On the basis of these CTTA data comparing normal values with
export prices and accepted by the CCRA, the CCRA concluded that there295
was reasonable evidence that dumping  of field tomatoes did occur in the
period under consideration, Oct. 1, 2000 to Sept. 30, 2001.  Further, the
estimated dumping margins ranged from 14 percent to 76 percent as a
percentage of normal value.
Injury
The issue of injury was first addressed by the complainants (CTTA)
who argued that incomes had been reduced resulting from price suppres-
sion by U.S. imports.  What makes this occur so clearly was that they
claimed that Canadian greenhouse grower are price takers, that their price
is primarily determined by the Canadian selling price of tomatoes from the
United States.  They estimated the loss of revenue due to this dumping at
$20 million annually.  They argued that the lowered prices, in addition to
reducing incomes, have reduced incentives to expand and upgrade opera-
tions and this raises the risk of lowered capital investment, employment
and market share.  The argument that Canadian tomato growers are basi-
cally price takers, is in contrast to the arguments made by U.S. complain-
ants in the U.S. anti-dumping case described above.
The issue of injury was taken up further by the Canadian Interna-
tional Trade Tribunal (CITT) which issued its preliminary determination of
injury on January 8, 2002.  As in the U.S. case, the issues of “like goods”
and “domestic industry” were the first that were addressed.  The criteria
are similar to those used by the USITC, except that demand side factors
including substitutability and pricing appear to get (appropriately) more
attention. With briefs submitted from both sides, the Canadian greenhouse
growers and the U.S. field tomato growers, the CITT concluded that the
similarities between greenhouse tomatoes outweighed the differences.
Therefore, the “subject goods” were judged to be one class of goods, fresh
tomatoes, and that domestically grown tomatoes for fresh consumption
are “like goods” to the subject goods, imported fresh tomatoes.  On the
“domestic industry” question, greenhouse growers were judged to repre-
sent a major proportion (over 85 percent) of domestic fresh market tomato
production.
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On the question of injury, the Tribunal examined the evidence sub-
mitted by the CTTA, which cited persistent dumping of U.S. tomatoes that
has depressed Canadian greenhouse tomato prices. This argument was
supported by many letters from greenhouse tomato producers.  The Tribu-
nal did not collect independent data on these matters, but found from the
evidence presented that there is a reasonable indication that the domestic
industry has been injured by dumping of the subject goods.
THE ECONOMICS OF ANTI-DUMPING IN TOMATOES
There is a long history in the literature of economics of dissatisfac-
tion with anti-dumping measures and procedures.  It has long been ar-
gued, going back at least to Viner (1923), that anti-dumping provisions
only serve protectionists, particularly the interests of firms desiring protec-
tion against normal and fair competition from foreign firms.  Much of what
is argued to be dumping is garden-variety price discrimination, which is
neither illegal in domestic commerce nor rare.
Another argument is that if dumping occurs, it benefits consumers
by offering them a cheaper source of the commodity in question.  Mea-
sures that prevent consumers from  obtaining a cheaper source would typi-
cally not be in a country’s overall interest, unless of course it would repre-
sent only temporary gains, followed by higher prices, as would occur from
predatory pricing.
The only substantial concern that anti-dumping measures address
is this exercise of  market power by a firm wishing to injure its competitor
sufficiently by undercutting its prices, and driving the competitor out of
business, then later raising prices.  This is the practice known as predatory
pricing.  In this context, anti-dumping measures might be considered as an
international application of anti-trust or competition policy.  If this aspect
of anti-dumping were given importance, there would be within the regula-
tions some effort to address the extent of market power of the dumping
firm, yet such provisions are not in place.  There have been attempts to
modify anti-dumping procedures so they would more closely mimic anti-
trust or competition policies (Krishna, undated).  However, efforts such as297
these to limit the applicability of anti-dumping measures have usually run
into strong political opposition from firms that see anti-dumping measures
as helpful sources of protection when any industry is under some  com-
petitive stress.
In fact, many would argue that the abuse of anti-dumping mea-
sures by firms and industries seeking another means of achieving protec-
tive duties against imports is one of the major weaknesses in the existing
trade rules.  Consequently, it is on the agenda of the current Doha Round
of WTO negotiations to find ways to reform the existing Article and the
national regulations that fall under the original GATT Article VI (1994)
and the WTO Agreement on Implementation of GATT Article VI.
However, I wish to focus more on the economics of the agriculture
industry in general and the tomato industry in particular, and the validity
of these anti-dumping actions from an economic perspective. I wish to
argue that proving dumping and injury is particularly easy in the agricul-
tural sector due to some of its inherent economic characteristics, when
combined with the kind of anti-dumping procedures we see so clearly
applied in both tomato cases.  We will consider first determination of dump-
ing and the normal value calculation, with reference to domestic prices
and costs of production.  Then we will turn to injury determination, where
the comments will focus on the evidence needed for injury.
On domestic prices and normal value, all it takes for a dumping
margin to be determined is for there to be some price discrimination be-
tween the domestic market and the export market.  Especially for smaller
countries selling into larger ones, it is not unusual to find there is more
competition in export markets than in the domestic market.  Either for
reasons of active price discrimination or for a firm that is a price taker in
export markets but with an element of market power at home, any profit-
maximizing firm will price higher domestically than in the more competi-
tive, more elastic demand, export market. By itself, this will meet the test
of dumping.  As there is more product differentiation as one can expect
with increased consumer interest in identity preservation, the ability of
firms to choose their prices will be enhanced and the situation described
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above will be more common.  It is already common in horticultural prod-
ucts.
On cost of production and normal value, the situation is even more
pre-disposed to meet the test of dumping.  In virtually all agricultural com-
modities, especially in the horticulture sector, the trend in real producer
prices is downward.  What is going on is no mystery to economists in the
agriculture sector, of course; there is a long history of improvements in
technology and increased productivity in producing the farm commodity.
This means two things.  First, it means that firms which are slow in adopt-
ing the improved methods are going to face cost-price squeezes and some
will be driven, by poor financial performance, out of the industry.  These
situations will bias upward the likelihood of disclosing losses in the indus-
try.  Second, with the necessary lags in getting cost data up-to-date, yet the
more immediate evidence on prices, there will be a stronger likelihood of
finding costs exceeding revenues, even for the firms that are keeping up-
to-date in their technology.  Third, in a slight variation on this last point,
farmers will be making decisions on which market to serve and at what
prices based on marginal costs, yet the calculated cost of production data
is explicitly average cost in nature.
In addition, there are cycles in agricultural commodity prices that
frequently extend beyond the two or three years used in anti-dumping
analyses, and in the lower parts of the cycle, it is a foregone conclusion
that farm prices will be below costs of production.
As a consequence of a variety of reasons, it is not surprising to find
in the production of an agricultural commodity that export prices may be
below costs of production.  What makes the results on anti-dumping inves-
tigations even more meaningless in terms of the economics of the industry
is that firms can be found to be “selling at a loss” in both their export
markets and their domestic markets.  What kind of economic sense does
this make?  Obviously the time period is too short to give a long run pic-
ture, or the cost data are inappropriate.299
For similar reasons, these characteristics of the agriculture sector
make it pre-disposed to a finding of injury.  First, on like-product ques-
tions, what is really important is the price determination process of the
domestic product in the allegedly injured industry. What effect in the me-
dium to longer term on the price of that product is likely to arise from an
increase in the “dumped” imports?  This requires attention to demand side
characteristics and the substitutability of the import and the domestic prod-
uct in the consumption decisions of the consumers.  Supply side character-
istics are secondary.
In terms of injury to the industry, let us look at the greenhouse
tomato industry from an aggregate perspective.  Here is a market where
demand is growing at 13 percent per year.   Production within the United
States is growing at about the same annual rate, 12.3 percent, and capacity
is growing at about the same rate, 12.6 percent.  This means that the U.S.
market  share is being maintained, despite growing Canadian imports.
However, industry volume  growth rates of 12 percent per year is unusu-
ally rapid growth in any context, and investment in the industry is growing
equivalently.  This does not suggest injury.  The same kind of data  emerged
in the Canadian case against US imports.
On the pricing side in this market there are several salient charac-
teristics.  First, with the institutional arrangements for pricing and the in-
dustry structure, this market does not look like one with any significant
market power being exerted.  This is especially true when you look at the
strong influence of fresh field tomatoes on the greenhouse price. So there
is no evidence of any predatory pricing or the structural elements that
would generate it.
Second, Canadian product in the greenhouse tomato market ac-
counts for one-third of all greenhouse tomatoes, which by itself would
give a modest degree of market power.   However, in the context of substi-
tution with fresh tomatoes, Canadian imports account for only about 5
percent of the market.  The ability to affect prices under these conditions is
very small indeed.
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Third, real prices in this market are falling, just as is the case in
virtually all farm   commodities.  Taking USDA annual prices for fresh
tomatoes from 1989 to 2000 for the   country as a whole, deflating them by
the Consumer Price Index, and regressing the real price series against a
time variable, the trend rate of decline is –3.3 percent.  This is a relatively
rapid rate of decline in real prices, although not unusual for the horticul-
tural industry.  These data serve to underline all that was said above about
the impact of declining real prices.  Injury as defined for dumping investi-
gations will be relatively easy to show under such conditions.
From this quick review of the apparent economics of the U.S. to-
mato industry, it does not appear that the industry is being injured in ag-
gregate, and it certainly does not look like any financial distress that may
exist with some firms is due to Canadian imports.
Once the preliminary determinations are available for the Cana-
dian case, it is highly   likely that the same observations can be made.
There is a healthy U.S. tomato industry  that is growing and exporting field
tomatoes, albeit with more competition from the greenhouse tomato sector
(Cook, 2002).  But there is substantial technical change occurring with
relatively rapid declines in real prices, and it is likely this situation will lead
Canadian investigators, following their own legal procedures, to find that
dumping is also occurring.  These investigations may also find injury, but
again, the injury is not due to an economic definition of dumping.  Any
injury being imposed on Canadian tomato growers will be due to the nor-
mal market forces of improving technology and declining real prices, con-
ditions faced by all participants in all segments of the fresh tomato market.
CONCLUSIONS
Anti-dumping regulations and actions are one of the most contro-
versial elements of  current trade policy.  The economic arguments against
dumping have been going on for the best part of this century and these
tomato cases illustrate the weak economic foundations of  those regula-
tions once again.  Moreover, the rationale for these trade applications are
even weaker in  the agricultural sector than for cases in manufacturing.301
Both of the tomato dumping cases we have reviewed followed
established legal  structure and procedures.  However, due to the combina-
tion of the dumping tests and  procedures, and certain characteristics of the
agricultural sector, in both the U.S. and Canadian cases, the decisions had
a high probability of resulting in dumping decisions and duties.  The con-
ditions within the agriculture sector that pre-dispose it to dumping deci-
sions are a combination of price cycles and negative real price trends, plus
the more general   phenomenon of price discrimination that is not unique
to agriculture.
Neither of these cases represents behavior that an economist would
call dumping.  There is no monopoly power involved in one or a small
number of firms and no evidence of predatory pricing. In both cases, the
exporting firms alleged to be causing the dumping are selling the same
commodity in their own markets and were found to be selling below cost
in those markets. How can it be that a large number of firms in both coun-
tries, with apparently plenty of competition and market growth for their
product, are hurting themselves by selling below cost in both markets?
There is no economic logic to such behavior.  Selling below cost is some-
times unavoidable when a firm is a price taker and in a period of low
prices.  It is not a choice for such firms and it is not dumping by any
reasonable definition of the term.
What makes the current dumping regulations laughable is that the
facts of both the cases are indistinguishable from normal competition in
international markets where there are  some firms that may have acquired
some competitive advantage or increased efficiency, for example from
improved technology or favourable exchange rate movements, and who
are acting to exploit those advantages in competitive markets.  There is no
injury occurring due to exports from the other country.  The only injury
some of these firms are experiencing is due to declining real prices that are
putting pressures on the finances of these firms, a situation we find in most
parts of agriculture.  However, the end result of these anti-dumping provi-
sions, that are so well illustrated by these two cases that are not unique to
one country or another, is the considerably increased likelihood of extra
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duties being imposed, a retreat from freer trade, and a reversion to more
protection in the agricultural sector.
POSTSCRIPT
In April 2002, the U.S. International Trade Commission completed
its Final Investigation of the case on Greenhouse Tomatoes from Canada.
Although the U.S. Department of Commerce had earlier established that
greenhouse tomatoes had been dumped into the U.S. market (sold at less
than fair value), the ITC determined that “an industry in the United States
is not materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of
imports of greenhouse tomatoes from Canada” (USITC, p. 1).  This deci-
sion was not unanimous; one commissioner held a dissenting view.
A critical part of this decision was the determination of domestic
like-product and  industry.  In this case the Commission found “that differ-
ences between greenhouse and field tomatoes generally represent varia-
tions in the quality of the tomato rather than distinctions that represent
clear dividing lines.” (USITC, p. 4).  This judgment follows three previous
USITC tomato cases where no distinction was made across all forms and
varieties of fresh tomatoes.  Furthermore, this conclusion was shown to be
consistent with end uses of the tomato as well as physical characteristics,
distribution channels, and consumer perceptions.  The Commission also
determined that there is a single domestic industry that includes all fresh
tomatoes, and that it includes all producers of fresh tomatoes.  The dissent-
ing view drew the opposite conclusion on what was “like-product.”
On the issue of injury, the Commission stated that the facts are
consistent with the   characterization that tomato growers are “price-tak-
ers” (p. 18).  The volume of Canadian   greenhouse tomato imports were
judged to be not significant absolutely or relatively, with reference to the
U.S. market.  Over the period of growth in Canadian greenhouse tomato
exports in the latter 1990s, the share of the U.S. market accounted by U.S.
tomato production generally grew.  Prices tended to be driven by the vol-
ume of all fresh tomatoes, not by Canadian greenhouse tomatoes.  Indeed,
the Canadian product tended to sell at prices above the U.S. competition.303
When looking at only U.S. greenhouse tomato growers, any financial dif-
ficulties were due to short term (one to two year) industry price move-
ments, not the impact of Canadian imports.  Finally, there was judged to be
no threat of material injury in the future due to Canadian greenhouse to-
mato imports.
In the Canadian case on the dumping of U.S. fresh tomato imports
into Canada, the result was very similar.  Although there was a determina-
tion by the CCRA on dumping (selling  below fair value) in March 2002,
the Canadian International Trade Tribunal concluded, like the U.S. ITC,
that “the dumping of the aforementioned goods has not caused material
injury or retardation and is not threatening to cause material injury to the
domestic industry” (CITT, p. 1).
A unique aspect to this finding is that the Canadian tomato indus-
try complainants (the CTTA) decided just prior to the public hearing in
June, 2002, that it did not wish to advance its case at this hearing and
requested that the CITT terminate proceedings on the dumping investiga-
tion.  The Tribunal did cancel the hearing but completed the investigation
on the basis of previously available written evidence.
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